During World War II, the USA and UK plotted to place France under Allied administration after the war, instead of restoring the French government. Why would they consider this, and how different would the world today be if this had gone through?

This article examines the political context and the personalities behind what happened.

The state of France

In September 1939 Britain and France declared war on Germany for invading Poland¹. Eight months later, Germany invaded France causing an unprecedented crisis^{1 2}. France’s third Republic’s weakest link was a lack of military preparedness. On 22 June 1940, France surrendered to Hitler^{1 2}. The government gave up and handed over all its power to Marshal Philippe Pétain^{1 2}. A World War 1 veteran, Pétain established the Vichy government in the southern half of the country^{1 2}. He left the north and west of France to Germany^{1 2}. On paper it was independent, but it was a Nazi client state.

General Charles de Gaulle fled to London² where he broadcast messages of support to the French resistance. He got UK funding for a government-in-exile, but he was not a government representative because there was no French government any more. If any other senior ranking Frenchman had made it to the UK first, the name de Gaulle may never have been well-known.

By the summer of 1940, France was no different to Nazi-annexed Bohemia or Nazi-controlled Poland.

But what did the Allies think of France at the time?

The Anglo-Saxon thinking about France

US President Franklin Roosevelt had great antipathy towards Charles de Gaulle^{2 3}. Roosvelt thought him an unelected rightwing dictator and a puppet of communists and the USSR^{2 3}. This is how the press portrayed de Gaulle at the time, too. Roosevelt went as far as stating that de Gaulle was “the man in whom I have the least confidence”⁴.

The two were stubborn men motivated by principles they were unwilling to compromise on⁵. Both had good points, but both were unwilling to back down.

If Roosevelt – the USA – had such thoughts, what was going to happen to France?

The AMGOT plan

By 1942, the United States had entered the war. It wanted to set up a grand organization called the Allied Military Government of the Occupied Territories^{3 4}. This would govern the soon-to-be-defeated Italy, Germany, Japan and also France^{3 4}. If it had taken place, there would have been no French sovereignty, including the right to mint currency³. The Americans wanted more; they also wanted open access to French colonies⁴, with a view to de-imperialising the world.

De Gaulle had, by then, spent a lot of time talking about restoring French sovereignty^{3 6}. For him, liberating France, rebuilding the military and sovereignty were all aspects of the same principle^{2 7}. He could not imagine one without the other. Despite the rhetoric, the elite in Vichy France wanted to go from their German-controlled situation to Pax Americana after the war³.

It’s not clear if de Gaulle knew of AMGOT; but how could he reverse this thinking?

The fly in the ointment

On 23 October 1944, the Allied forces recognised de Gaulle as the head of the French government³. Many other Central European governments had also recognised it⁵. By December 1944, France signed a mutual security treaty with Moscow, offsetting US influence in Europe³. Now that he had formal recognition, the Allies had to consult him about France. de Gaulle had managed this because he made sure he was in France after D-Day. He immediately set about appointing people to “his” administration⁴, and whipped up popular support with a roaring speech in Bayeaux. While he couldn’t do much for many more months, he now had a government-in-waiting.

De Gaulle was cunning enough to make sure he had a seat at the table. And with that seat, he secured the future of France.

What if?

European history would have been different with an American-occupied France. What’s interesting is to figure out how different it would be today, eighty years after the war:

• France. A new independent country would have emerged soon enough. It took 4 years for West Germany to rebuild so there’s no reason to think France wouldn’t have been able to as well.
  Given the American insistence on self-determination, it’s possible pro-independence feelings in Corsica and Brittany would have wrangled independence.
  Conclusion: France would still exist today, but it would be a smaller country.
• French colonies. Some French colonies and interests across the globe would have asked for independence.  It’s hard to say whether they all would have, or if only a few would have. It is obvious that any pro-independence (or anti-French) sentiment would have leveraged the situation though. If this had happened, the Algerian war and the Vietnam war may have never happened. It also means that the current European Union would have a reduced global reach.
  Conclusion: France would have lost its empire and with it, prestige.
• Franco-German relations. This issue was the one that had led Europe to war more than three times over the course of a century. It would have been natural for an Allied administration to consider the idea of a united Europe. What better way to do this than to have a federal Allied government with West Germany and France under one single structure?
  Conclusion: A united Europe may have been more likely, but how resentful would the French have been to such a suggestion?

• The European Steel and Coal Committee. Even without an imposed federal structure, France came up with the idea of centralisation on its own. The brainchild of French foreign minister Robert Schumann laid the foundations for the present European Union⁸. There’s no telling if Schumann would have proposed this idea if there was no government for him to be a member of. 
  At the same time, his vision didn’t come out of nowhere. The idea of a united Europe was not new, and the idea of tying France and Germany together was part of American foreign policy through its Marshall plan⁹.
  Conclusion: The EU would have existed anyway, but without a strong French (and Francophone) centre.
• The European Union. Britain had tried to join the European Community – twice – back in the 60s and it was De Gaulle who refused to let them in. There’s no telling if more time in the community would have influenced modern European history. I can say that without a French counterpart, Britain’s influence in the EU would have been stronger and Brexit would have had fewer disadvantages.
  Conclusion: Brexit would not have been an “us-and-them” discussion, but a “shall-we-continue-leading-or-not” debate.

Sometimes one man can change the world.

References

1. Pattison, P. (2023). The Fall of France in the Second World War. [online] English Heritage. Available at: https://www.english-heritage.org.uk/visit/places/dover-castle/history-and-stories/fall-of-france/[↩][↩][↩][↩][↩][↩]
2. Barnett, G. (2009). Free France Resurgent: Charles de Gaulle in World War II. [online] Warfare History Network. Available at: https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/free-france-resurgent-charles-de-gaulle-in-world-war-ii/[↩][↩][↩][↩][↩][↩][↩][↩][↩]
3. Lacroix-Riz, A. (2003). When the US wanted to take over France. [online] Le Monde diplomatique. Available at: https://mondediplo.com/2003/05/05lacroix [Accessed 22 Jan. 2025][↩][↩][↩][↩][↩][↩][↩][↩][↩]
4. tanguy.morel@ihedn.fr (2024). De Gaulle et les États-Unis : une confiance bâtie dans le rapport de forces. [online] L’IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale. Available at: https://ihedn.fr/en/lundis-de-lihedn/de-gaulle-et-les-etats-unis-une-confiance-batie-dans-le-rapport-de-forces/ [Accessed 22 Jan. 2025][↩][↩][↩][↩][↩]
5. Army.mil. (2025). Chapter XXIV Planning for France Extends Beyond D-Day. [online] Available at: https://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/civaff/ch24.htm [Accessed 22 Jan. 2025][↩][↩]
6. Amado, M. (2010). Nationalism in Charles de Gaulle’s Speeches During World War II Nationalism in Charles de Gaulle’s Speeches During World War II. [online] Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3036&context=etd[↩]
7. Gouv.fr. (2025). Rebuilding the French Army (1943-1945) | Chemins de mémoire. [online] Available at: https://www.cheminsdememoire.gouv.fr/en/rebuilding-french-army-1943-1945[↩]
8. étrangères, M. de l’Europe et des A. (n.d.). II – European Coal and Steel Community. [online] France Diplomacy – Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/the-ministry-and-its-network/the-diplomatic-archives/documents-from-the-diplomatic-archives/the-birth-of-europe-the-treaty-establishing-the-european-coal-and-steel/ii-european-coal-and-steel-community/[↩]
9. McCourt, D. (2021). Hegemonic Field Effects in World Politics: The United States and the Schuman Plan of 1950. Journal of Global Security Studies, [online] 6(3). doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa035[↩]

Remember: links were correct at time of publication.